Since spring 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented reeducation campaign. According to media and informant reports, untold thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims have been and are being detained in clandestine political re-education facilities, with major implications for society, local economies and ethnic relations. Considering that the Chinese state is currently denying the very existence of these facilities, this paper investigates publicly available evidence from official sources, including government websites, media reports and other Chinese internet sources. First, it briefly charts the history and present context of political re-education. Second, it looks at the recent evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of 'de-extremification' work. Finally, it evaluates detailed empirical evidence pertaining to the present re-education drive. With Xinjiang as the 'core hub' of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question.
part of the formal prison system, and inmates are convicted through legal proceedings.
In contrast, the "re-education through labour" system (laodong jiaoyang; 劳动教养) or in short laojiao was established in 1957 as an administrative penalty and internment system. Anyone could be sentenced to laojiao by the public security agencies without trials or legal procedures (Mühlhahn, 2009) . Revived in the 1980s, laojiao was widely used for dissidents, petitioners or petty criminals. Even family members or employers could recommend persons for re-education (Laogai Research Foundation, 2008, 17) .
Both the leadership under Xi Jinping and the population felt that sending people into such camps without legal proceedings, merely at the whims of local police authorities, was no longer appropriate in a modern society governed by the rule of law. A pertinent example is the case of Tang Hui, who was placed into laojiao in 2012 for protesting the lenient sentences given to those who had forced her daughter into prostitution, causing considerable public outrage (Green, 2014) . Since their abolishment, many laojiao facilities have become centres for coercive isolated detoxification treatments given to drug addicts (qiangzhi geli jiedu; 强制隔离戒毒) (Sina News, 2013) .
In the early 2000s, another term for re-education emerged. In order to convert Falun Gong followers away from their spiritual pursuits, the state initiated so-called
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"transformation through education" (jiaoyu zhuanhua; 教育转化) classes (Tong, 2009, 106) . The Chinese term zhuanhua, which effectively turns "education" into (political) reeducation, literally means to "transform" or to "convert". It is also used to describe the chemical process of isomerization by which one molecule is transformed into another. A state media report from 2001 describes the initiation of Falun Gong-related "reeducation classes" (jiaoyu zhuanhua xuexiban; 教育转化学习班) throughout the country, including Xinjiang's Ürümchi (Renminwang, 2001 ).
Besides combating the Falun Gong, the state also employs "transformation through education" in educational contexts. So-called "problem students" are subjected to "transformation through education", although this often takes place in regular school contexts and only sometimes in closed training contexts or dedicated institutions.
Finally, "transformation through education" is a common concept in the context of China's coercive isolated detoxification.
Political Re-Education in Contrast to Other Forms of Internment
Akin to re-education through labour (laojiao), political re-education in Xinjiang is an extrajudicial procedure that does not replace criminal punishment or reform through labour (laogai). The region's re-education facility network therefore operates alongside the regular prison and detention system.
For example, an official report on Dunbar Village (Kashgar Prefecture) distinguishes between: a) convicts who have been sentenced (panxing; 判刑, i.e. to prison), b) suspects who have been detained (shouya; 收押, i.e. in detention centres, awaiting judgment), and c) those in political re-education (jiaoyu zhuanhua renyuan; 教育转化人员) (Liu, 2017) .
Similarly, sources with close acquaintances in Xinjiang told the author that detained suspects there may be first placed in detention centres (kanshousuo; 看守所) in order to evaluate whether they will be sent to political re-education or to prison (see also Shih, 2018) .
Typically, the use of the term "transformation through education" in Xinjiang is restricted to: a) political re-education of the general population (especially of Muslim minorities), b) political re-education of cadres (especially so-called "two-faced persons"
liangmianren; 两面人), and c) persons detained for coerced detoxification (XUAR Food and Drug Inspection and Management Bureau, 2017) . Occasionally, it is also applied to those in prison, usually in connection with the concept of "de-extremification" (and therefore presumably in regard to sentenced "religious extremists"). However, the more common term for the re-education of those sentenced to prison terms is jiaoyu gaizao (教育改造), akin to "reform through labour" (laodong gaizao).
In terms of the different facility names, reform through labour typically takes place in prisons (jianyu; 监狱) while the former re-education through labour system was located in re-education "facilities" or "camps" (laojiaosuo; 劳教所). In contrast, Xinjiang's contemporary political re-education drive is conducted through a network of "transformation through education" "centres" (zhongxin; 中心), "bases" (jidi; 基地) and "schools" (xuexiao; 学 校 ) (compare Table 1 ). Locals often refer to re-education internment as "attending/entering class" (jin xuexiban; 进学习班), or "getting an education" (shoudao jiaoyu; 受到教育).
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Despite some exceptions, these distinct uses and terminologies have aided the author's task of identifying material related to the political re-education of Muslim populations in Xinjiang.
The Inception of "De-Extremification" through Re-Education in Xinjiang
It was not until 2014 that the "transformation through education" concept in Xinjiang came to be used in wider contexts than the Falun Gong, Party discipline or drug addict rehabilitation. Prior to that year, public references to "transformation through education" in the context of combating religious extremism and stability maintenance are very rare. A district in Turpan City, a majority Uyghur region, reported in August 2013 that it was undertaking "transformation through education work" (jiaoyu zhuanhua gongzuo; 教育转化工作) in order to deal with "four special types of people"
(sizhong teshu renqun; 四种特殊人群), including young men who grow beards (Turpan City Party Net, 2013) . Transformation through education goals were determined on a case-by-case basis and implemented through home visits and vocational training rather than internment in dedicated facilities. Back then, re-education efforts concentrated on a limited number of "focus persons" (zhongdianren; 重点人).
The increasingly widespread application of "transformation through education" to Uyghur or Muslim population groups arose in tandem with the "de-extremification" (qu jiduanhua; 去极端化) campaign. The phrase "de-extremification" was first mentioned by . Since 2013, "transformation through education" work has been closely tied to "de-extremification".
For example, an August 2014 news report about "de-extremification" work in Qaghiliq (Yecheng) County, a Uyghur majority region in Xinjiang's southern Kashgar Prefecture, described a newly established centralized re-education initiative that subjected 259
"problem persons" (wenti renyuan; 问题人员) to 10 days of "closed-style" training (fengbishi peixun; 封闭式培训) (Lin, 2014) . Activities followed a detailed schedule and included discussions, writing personal reflections, and watching educational videos. This is one of the first reports that describes re-education in a closed setting and over a limited time period. Whether this took place in a dedicated facility is unclear.
Similarly, in 2015, Chapchal County in Ili Prefecture, which has a 66 percent minority population (28 percent Uyghur), held a 15 day "centralized transformation through education training class using a fully closed-style management" (This Year's Graduating Class Net, 2015) . This training targeted 42 persons categorized as "class A" group (i.e.
the most recalcitrant). The training included military drill, patriotic singing, criminal law, marriage law, patriotic videos, writing personal statements and reflections, acting out contents through drama performance, and other activities. According to the report, the whole class rose up, broke out in tears, with participants emotionally announcing that they must "repent" and "become new persons". Such graphic descriptions of emotional displays of personal repentance as the necessary and expected result of political reeducation are highly reminiscent of oral histories of self-criticisms conducted during the Maoist era. Eyewitnesses who went through re-education in 2017 told Western media outlets that they were made to memorize patriotic texts, confess their "faults", criticize their religious traditions and denounce fellow internees (Shih, 2018) . Those who fail to follow these orders face harsh punishments, including sleep and food deprivation, solitary confinement and beatings.
Meanwhile, the re-education system also began to evolve into a network of dedicated facilities. A November 2014 news report stated that Konashähär (Shufu) County located in Kashgar Prefecture had established a three-tiered "transformation through education base" (jiaoyu zhuanhua jidi; 教育转化基地) system as part of its "de-extremification" efforts (Xinjiang Daily, 2014a) . So-called "problem persons" were subjected to "centralized transformation through education" (jizhong jiaoyu zhuanhua; 集中教育转化 ) (Xinjiang Daily, 2014b) . This system of bases, some titled "legal system training schools" (fazhi peixun xuexiao; 法制培训学校), was set up at county, township and village levels, with participants who failed to achieve "transformation" being successively passed on to the base at the next highest level. A three-tiered re-education system on these levels is likewise mentioned in a 2017 government research paper, and has apparently found widespread adoption (Qiu Yuanyuan, 2017, 76) . Similarly, bid documents discussed below prove the existence or construction of such facilities at city, county, township and village levels.
By late 2014, Konashähär's re-education system had held a total of 203 sessions involving 3,515 persons, of which 88 percent were successfully "transformed through education". Detainees thoroughly studied the "harmful" ways of religious extremism and sang patriotic songs. "Out of their own initiative", they replaced their burkas with modern Uyghur ethnic dress and "returned to a secular lifestyle." According to informants and observers, re-education classes in 2017 and 2018 additionally placed an In 2015 also appeared the first media report stating the actual capacity of a centralized re-education facility. Khotän City's dedicated "de-extremification transformation through education training centre" (qujiduanhua jiaoyu zhuanhua peixun zhongxin; 去极 端化教育培训中心) was reported to hold up to 3,000 detainees whose thinking was "deeply affected" by "religious extremism" (Xinjiang Daily, 2015a) . "Transformation through education" was achieved through ethnic unity education, psychological counselling, lectures in government policy and other activities. Khotän's facility began operations in March 2015 and used "military-style management" (Xinjiang Daily, 2015b) .
As confirmation of the internment-like character of these facilities, a late 2015 government report of an official visit to Lopnur (Yuli) County's "de-extremification transformation through education centre" (qujiduanhua jiaoyu zhuanhua zhongxin; 去极 端化教育转化中心) shows a picture of a barbed wire-clad walled compound .
Meanwhile, re-education methods had also become increasingly sophisticated. Ghulja (Yining) County, a majority Uyghur region in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, subjected 5,000 persons to re-education in 2014 (China Daily, 2015) . In order to improve transformational effectiveness, "focus persons" were grouped into four groups, labelled A to D, based on perceived severity. Group A, the most recalcitrant "strike hard detainees", received 20 days training. Group B, the "stubborn of thinking" group, got 15 days. Those with "unstable thinking" who were influenced by extremist thought were assigned to group C and subjected to 7 days training. Those who had only received light influence or may already have been reformed were in group D (4 days training).
According to a similar report in the "Observer" (Guanchazhe) , the "success rate" of this system stood at 70 percent (Guanchazhe, 16 October 2015) .
The same four-group re-education system was set up in Yuli County where one third of the population is Uyghur. According to the county's 2015 government work report, there had been 96 "transformation through education training classes" (jiaoyu zhuanhua peixun ban; 教育转化培训班) where 91.6 percent of the 1,945 participants were successfully "transformed" (Lopnur County Government, 2016) . The four-group (or "ABCD") system continued to be deployed in subsequent years. In 2016, Ghulja County set up "transformation through education classes" in its "social correction centre"
(shehui jiaozhi zhongxin; 社会矫治中心) (Yili News Net, 2017 humanistic concern], strengthening the outcome of transformation through education.
A potentially influential document in this development was a research paper published in June 2017 by Xinjiang's Ürümchi Party School (Qiu Yuanyuan, 2017) . According to this paper, the "punishment of criminal offenders and transformation through education are the key elements of de-extremification work" (p.74) . In order to demonstrate the "success" of re-education, the research paper cites survey results among 588 reeducated persons in Ili, Aqsu, Kashgar and Khotän prefectures. Whereas prior to reeducation, 68 percent of respondents were unaware of their "mistakes", afterwards 99 percent were able to "distinguish illegal religion" or showed a willingness to report others who were transgressing legal regulations (p.75). Consequently, the paper recommends the creation of "centralized transformation through education training centres" in all prefectures and counties, with capacities for at least 300 persons each.
The research paper lists three types of re-education facilities: "centralized transformation through education training centres" (jizhong jiaoyu zhuanhua peixun zhongxin; 集中教育转化培训中心), "legal system schools" (fazhi xuexiao; 法制学校), and "rehabilitation correction centres" (kangfu jiaozhi zhongxin; 康复矫治中心). These different naming conventions are also reflected in official government procurement and construction bids related to these facilities, and all of them have at least some bids that specify strong security features such as walls, fences, barbed wire, monitoring systems and guard rooms (Table 1 ). According to the paper, re-education facilities may be located at existing criminal detention centres (kanshousuo or baoliusuo; 抱留所), in police training centres (jingcha peixun zhongxin; 警察培训中心), or will have been newly constructed. Government construction bids indicate that they are sometimes part of extensive new compounds that also host criminal detention centres, police stations or even supermarkets (Table 1) .
In May 2017, the first official "education through transformation" related recruitment [Through] religious guidance, legal education, skills training, psychological interventions and multiple other methods, the effectiveness of transformation through education must be increased, thoroughly reforming them toward a healthy heart attitude...
In this context, a "healthy heart attitude" not only denotes a general attitude of submission to the state and its laws, but also a way of thinking that is aligned with core Socialist ideological tenets (and consequently largely irreligious).
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The Costs and Features of Re-Education Facilities
The start of Chen Quanguo's re-education initiative is indicated not only by public recruitment notices but also by related government procurement and construction bids (caigou xiangmu; 采 购 项 目 and jianshe xiangmu; 建 设 项 目 ). Local and regional governments increasingly advertise construction projects or equipment procurements through public or private bidding announcement websites. This research uses a conservative approach by largely restricting the analysed bid data set to procurements that specifically mention "transformation through education" or "legal system training".
It includes a limited number of vocational training centre and correction centre bids in instances where these facilities appear to serve as loci of re-education and/or internment.
Only one re-education related bid was advertised prior to Chen Quanguo's ascent to power in Xinjiang in August 2016. Nearly all bids were announced from March 2017, just prior to the publication of the "de-extremification ordinance" and start of the reeducation drive ( Figure 2 , based on Table 1 ). Likewise, the values attached to these bids were by far highest in the months immediately after the start of the re-education campaign ( Figure 3 ). We can assume that only a fraction of re-education facility construction is reflected in these bids, since not all construction is done through public bidding and several re-education camps are converted existing facilities such as schools.
Also, several bids did not specify a cost estimate. Even so, this data indicates a pattern consistent with re-education policy and implementation. Advertised value of re-education related government procurement bids in Xinjiang (million RMB)
indicating that existing buildings will be used to house more people for longer periods of time. Several of the listed facilities are very large, with total compound sizes in excess of 10,000sqm. One bid combines vocational training and re-education facilities over a total area of 82,000sqm. Another calls for a hospital and a supermarket within the same compound. A former detainee estimated that his re-education facility held nearly 6,000
detainees (RFERL, 2018) . At a reported occupancy density of 1.5-2 detainees per sqm of dorm floor space, this would require a 3,000-4,000sqm dormitory, which is certainly realistic for the larger facilities (Twitter, 2018) .
Many bids mandate the installation of comprehensive security features that turn existing facilities into prison-like compounds: surrounding walls, security fences, wire mesh, barbed wire, reinforced security doors and windows, surveillance systems, secure access systems, watchtowers, guard rooms, police stations or facilities for armed police forces (wujing; 武警). One re-education centre procurement bid called for "special doors
and beds for prison cell use", emphasizing that this equipment must comply with criminal detention centre standards. Another bid noted that the surveillance system must comprehensively cover the entire facility, leaving "no blind spots" (wusijiao; 无死 角). Evidently, these features are not merely designed to prevent unauthorized access to these compounds, as could be expected in a highly securitized environment. Rather, they are explicitly set up to keep internees securely detained.
In total, Due to the scale of re-education facility construction, local budget reports sometimes contain related information. Aqto (Aketao) County's budget report shows that in 2017 it spent 383.4 million RMB or 9.6 percent of its entire annual budget on various security- Several Uyghurs and others with direct links to Xinjiang told the author that reeducation facilities are often disguised as vocational training centres, a practice also witnessed by reporters and in interviews with former detainees (e.g. Rajagopalan, 2017) . This can be corroborated by information gleaned from government procurement and construction bids (all in Table 1 ).
For example, in September 2017, Qaramay City in northern Xinjiang commissioned a construction bid for a new "vocational skills education and training centre" (zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin; 职业技能教育培训中心). According to the bid description, this facility is designed to meet the city's critical security need to subject "key persons" to "transformation through education." In December 2017, Baghrash (Bohu) County in Bayingholin Prefecture issued a bid for various "stability maintenance" facilities, including a vocational training centre similarly specified to function as a "transformation through education base". The entire project, with a cost estimate of nearly 320 million RMB, was to include a police station, a detention centre and a special police base.
In July 2017, Qaraqash County (Khotän Prefecture) commissioned a large "educational training centre" (jiaoyu peixun zhongxin; 教育培训中心) that was to include multiple buildings, including a "transformation for education centre" and a massive 2,074sqm
armed police forces facility. Similarly, a district in Ürümchi published a construction bid for a 36,000sqm vocational training compound that was to include a surrounding wall, fences, a 500sqm police station, a surveillance and monitoring system, and "equipment for visiting family members". The latter is a video-based intercom system typically found in prisons. A vocational training centre bid for Yengisar (Yingjisha) County (Kashgar Prefecture), valued at 28 million RMB, was likewise to include a surrounding wall, a surveillance and monitoring system, equipment for visiting family members, and a police station. Satellite images of a combined re-education and a vocational training facility in Qaghiliq County show massive surrounding walls with watchtowers (details discussed below).
These security features corroborate informant reports that so-called vocational or other training facilities frequently function as well-secured internment camps. In some instances, they were retrospectively "hardened" for stronger internment capabilities, as with an October 2017 bid for the "centralized closed education and training centre"
(jizhong fengbi jiaoyu peixun zhongxin; 集中封闭教育培训中心) in Nilqa County (Ili Prefecture) to add a security fence and a monitoring and surveillance system. There is probably a continuum of facilities, with some vocational training centres having a primary focus on vocational training and a secondary focus on political re-education, while others operate with a reverse focus and likely in a more internment-like fashion.
Much evidence, however, points towards the latter.
Besides bids, public recruitment notices provide another key data source. From about In December 2017, Qitai County in Changji Prefecture, with a Muslim population of 26 percent, published a procurement bid for 260 special police unit outfits for its "public security bureau vocational skills training centre security staff", spending 431,860 RMB (Table 1) . If this were just a regular vocational skills training facility, the recruitment of such high numbers of dedicated security personnel with expensive special police outfits would be difficult to explain.
The actual operations of each vocational or other training facility evidently need to be examined on an individual basis. However, the available evidence is sufficient to establish clear links between the region's large-scale vocational training initiative, the re-education drive, and the widely observed phenomenon that large numbers of the adult Muslim population are being disappeared to receive "training" in various clandestine forms of internment.
Verification Through Satellite Images
Drawing on the work of Shawn Zhang, the author was able to verify the location and construction time frames of a number of re-education facilities in accordance with the information provided by construction bids. Of particular interest here is the ability to compare construction timings and floor sizes in order to provide additional verification. Another example is the Qaghiliq County legal system transformation through education and vocational training school. The bid issued in August 2017 called for the construction of a combined total of 82,000sqm floor space (Table 1) . Satellite images from June 8, 2017 of the specified location (Kuqi Village) show a large empty space next to the existing detention facility. 4 Images from October 2017 show that construction was mostly completed, and images from April 2018 display the finished complex along with surrounding walls and watchtowers. From the images we can estimate the total floor space of the eight large buildings at about 69,000sqm. Together with several smaller buildings located on the compound, this estimate comes close to the bid specification. As with the facility in Konashähär, the watchtowers have a square design and colorful roofs, distinct from the round towers found in the respective neighboring detention centres.
Influencing Popular Perceptions of Re-Education
In February The document then promises to dispel these misgivings by extolling the benefits of "transformation through education" as a free "treatment", effectively equating religiosity with a dangerous drug addiction. According to this logic, replacing religious beliefs with "correct" state ideology through re-education is akin to a detoxification process that is freely provided by a benevolent state. In other contexts, the state equates the battle against religious "extremism" with "eradicating the tumours" (Dooley, 2018) These medical analogies explain why the state feels no need to implement proper legal procedures for re-education, instead simply mandating arbitrarily high extra-judicial internment quotas (RFA, 2018c). Since re-education is presented as a "cure" for an "addiction", it cannot have harmful effects and must be applied indiscriminately. One
Han Chinese official explained this approach in blunt words:
. source within the region's public security agencies (Mizutani, 2018) of this estimate is of course predicated upon the supposed validity of the stated sources.
Additional confirmation comes from numerous anecdotal accounts from majority
Uyghur regions which indicate that adult internment shares frequently range between 10 and 20 percent, which is also consistent with the "problem population" ratios stated by the Khotän official (cited above). According to multiple reports, re-education centres are extremely crowded (RFA, 2017) . While there is no certainty, it is reasonable to speculate that the total number of detainees might range anywhere between several hundred thousand and just over one million.
According to government sources, China's former re-education through labour system operated about 350 facilities with 160,000 detainees in 2008 (Wang, 2012) . By The extrajudicial nature of re-education also means that it can be deployed as an increasingly effective and widespread threat. An informant stated that minorities who complain to their work superiors about working conditions are threatened with reeducation. Similarly, an assistant policeman from Qizilsu, a Kyrgyz minority region with a significant Uyghur population share, posted on a legal advice website that he wants to resign, but that his superior is threatening him with being sent to a re-education camp should he do so (china.findlaw.cn, February 3, 2018). These incidents exemplify how the extrajudicial nature of re-education can turn the system into a major source of abuse.
The fact such threats typically target minorities rather than Han renders this especially problematic.
Conclusions
The comprehensive evidence presented in this article shows how Xinjiang authorities adopted the transformation through education concept and are now indiscriminately subjecting large swaths of the Muslim population to extensive extrajudicial indoctrination procedures.
China's re-education drive in Xinjiang is arguably the country's most intense campaign of coercive social re-engineering since the Cultural Revolution. It represents the epitome of China's securitization approach in its restive western minority regions. With Xinjiang as the "core hub" of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question.
While the region's securitization drive reduced the number of officially reported violent incidents in 2017 to nearly zero, mere behavioural compliance is not sufficient.
Communist regimes have long considered political re-education as a core instrument for achieving lasting social control through "thought reform", ultimately resulting in an imagined "New Socialist Man" (Chen, 1969) . In this sense, the lessons learned from Xinjiang's re-education drive could become important for China's battle for the hearts and minds of the next generation. One potential way forward would be to prescribe different forms of re-education treatments for individuals with low scores in the upcoming nationwide social credit system (Roberts, 2018) . Aided by high-tech surveillance, such new forms of re-education could be much sleeker and more sophisticated than the blunt instrument Beijing is currently using among the Uyghurs.
Just as Xinjiang has become China's testing ground for cutting-edge surveillance 
